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RIGHTS OF THE CONVICTED FELON ON PAROLE
I. INTRODUCTION
The forfeiture of various civil rights upon conviction of a felony is no
modem innovation. Conviction of a crime in the Roman Republic resulted
in the deprivation of many of the same rights denied convicted felons
today.'
Most statutes define a "felony" in terms of the possible punishment for
a particular act rather than in descriptions of the actual conduct forbid-
den. 2 In Virginia "such offenses as are punishable with death or confine-
ment in the penitentiary are felonies," while "all other offenses are misde-
meanors."3 One unfortunate enough to be convicted of a felony becomes
subject to sanctions imposed by the state. In addition to bearing whatever
punishment may be meted out at trial, the convicted felon perhaps surpris-
ingly finds himself somewhat less than a citizen. By virtue of his new
distinction he has lost certain civil rights and incurred particular civil
disabilities. Upon parole' he will find additional restrictions placed on his
freedom until his final release.
I. STATUTORY DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
According to the Virginia Constitution, "[n]o person who has been
convicted of a felony shall be qualified to vote unless his civil rights have
been restored by the Governor or other appropriate authority." 5 This is the
right most commonly denied the convicted felon.' The Virginia statute
setting forth the qualifications for voter registration reiterates this provi-
sion.7 In a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court' similar provisions were
1. Note, Criminals' Loss of Civil Rights, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 328, 329 (1963).
2. Note, Restoration of Deprived Rights, 10 WM. & MARY L. REv. 924, 925 (1969).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-8 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
4. Parole is the conditional release of a convict from imprisonment, resulting in a discharge
of the remainder of his sentence if he makes a good reentry to society and a return to prison
to finish his term if he does not. It is usually within the administrative discretion of correc-
tional authorities. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1972); Wolin, After Re-
lease-The Parolee in Soceity, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1973).
Probation, on the other hand, is a judicial act allowing one convicted of an offense to be
awarded a suspended sentence and permitting him to remain at large as long as he exhibits
good behavior. See L. CARNEY, PROBATION AND PAROLE: LEGAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 83-84
(1977).
5. VA. CONST. art. II, § 1.
6. Note, Restoration of Deprived Rights, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 924, 926 (1969).
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-42 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
8. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). "Residence re-
quirements, age, previous criminal record. . . are obvious examples indicating factors which
a state may take into consideration in determining the qualifications of voters." Id. at 51.
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cited as being designed "to promote the intelligent use of the ballot,", and
it has been reiterated in later cases that such restrictions served that
purpose.' 0
Concomitant to the loss of voting rights is the loss of the right to hold
elective office. This loss is a result of a provision common to many state
constitutions that one of the qualifications for holding a particular office
is that one be qualified to vote for that office." One already holding public
office forfeits it upon the exhaustion of all his rights of appeal after convic-
tion of a felony.'2
The convicted felon also finds himself disqualified from serving as a juror
in federal'3 and state'4 courts. Such statutory provisions have been deemed
within the scope of a state's inherent powers.'5
A few states have passed laws providing that an individual convicted of
perjury is incompetent to serve as a witness.'" In Virginia, however, a prior
conviction of perjury or any other felony does not render one incompetent
to testify, but one's credibility may be attacked by the admission of such
evidence. 7
Courts have been divided as to whether or not a parolee is included
within statutes denying the convicted felon the right to bring a civil ac-
tion.'8 The problem does not arise in Virginia since the convicted felon is
subject to a disability to sue only during the period he is confined.'
In Virginia the convicted felon suffers a relatively minor loss if he is
convicted under the motor vehicle laws, since he loses his driver's license.'"
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 673 (1966)(dissenting
opinion Justice Black); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963).
11. E.g., VA. CONST. art. II, § 5.
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-79.3 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5)(Cum. Supp. 1978).
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-338 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
15. See, e.g., Duggar v. State, 43 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1949); People ex rel Denny v. Traeger,
372 Ill. 11, 22 N.E.2d 679 (1939); Walter v. State, 208 Ind. 231, 195 N.E. 268 (1935).
16. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 315 (Pardon 1958); tit. 19, § 682 (Pardon 1964).
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-269 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
18. See generally Annot., 74 A.L.R.3d 680, 714-18 (1976).
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-2 (Repl. Vol. 1977). According to Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200,
202 (4th Cir. 1972), only the confined felon's right to sue in an individual capacity is sus-
pended. Upon motion of any interested party a committee is appointed for a prisoner which
"may sue and be sued in respect to all claims or demands of every nature in favor of or against
such convict." VA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-307 (Repl. Vol. 1974). Unlike many states, Virginia does
not toll the statute of limitations during a period of incarceration; therefore, it is of para-
mount importance that a prisoner's committee institute any possible suits promptly. Almond
v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 203 (4th Cir. 1972).
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-417 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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There exists a prohibition against reissuance of the license within one year
after the Department of Motor Vehicle receives the record of conviction .2
In addition to loss of the above rights arising automatically by operation
of law upon a felony conviction, the states may vest professional regulatory
boards with the power to refuse the convicted felon permits or licenses
required to engage in a particular occupation.Y Such refusal, however, may
not be based solely upon the "prior conviction of a crime, unless such
criminal conviction directly relates to the trade, occupation or profession
for which the permit . . . is sought."' ' If the prior conviction does not
directly relate to the occupation concerned, the board may refuse to grant
a permit "if based upon all the information available, including the appli-
cant's record of prior convictions, it finds the applicant unfit or unsuited
to engage in such occupation ... ."21 This right of the states to establish
standards for entry into professions affecting the public interest has been
acknowledged by the Supreme Court.2
The federal government also places professional limitations on the con-
victed felon, specifically in regard to military service.2 6 By federal statute,
a convicted felon is not permitted to enlist in any of the armed services
unless the appropriate secretary authorizes an exception for a meritorious
case.Y
While in many states a felony conviction sharply limits the right to bear
arms,2 there exists no comparable statute in Virginia. However, under
federal law it is illegal for anyone "who has been convicted in any court
of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" to
receive,2 "ship or transport any firearm or ammunition in interstate or
foreign commerce."" The construction given to "interstate commerce" by
21. Id.
22. See generally Note, Criminals' Loss of Civil Rights, 16 U. FLA. L. Rv. 328 (1963); Note,
Restoration of Deprived Rights, 10 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 924 (1969).
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-1.15 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
24. Id.
25. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898). In reference to a state's power in this respect,
the Court held that:
It may require both qualifications of learning and of good character, and, if it deems
that one who has violated the criminal laws of the State is not possessed of sufficient
good character, it can deny to such a one the right to practice ... and, further, it may
make the record of a conviction conclusive evidence of the fact of the violation of the
criminal law and of the absence of the requisite good character. Id. at 191.
26. 10 U.S.C. § 504 (1975).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.23 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y. PENA LAw § 400.00
(McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) (1976).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1976).
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two federal cases3' makes the statute virtually applicable to any firearm;
however, the convicted felon may make an application for relief from this
law.3"
III. CONDITIONS OF PAROLE
In addition to the statutory deprivation of particular civil rights, the
convited felon on parole finds his freedom restricted by the conditions of
his parole.13 There exists in the United States today over fifty different
conditions in the various parole systems, yet not one of them is universally
employed in every jurisdiction.Y The most prevalent conditions are those
31. In United States '. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) the Court held that a nexus with
interstate commerce must be shown for conviction of receipt or possession of a firearm under
the federal statute. The Government had argued that that requirement applied only to the
"transport" element. But in Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977), petitioner's
argument that the nexus must be contemporaneous with possession was rejected. The Court
stated that there was "no indication that Congress intended to require any more than the
minimal nexus that the firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce." Id. at 575.
Furthermore, the Court felt that "Congress sought to reach possessions broadly. . . Indeed,
it was a close question in Bass" whether any proof of a nexus was required. Id. at 577.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(5)(c)(1976).
33. The courts are moving increasingly toward a greater recognition of the legal
rights of prisoners and parolees. Many of the unreasonably restrictive conditions
placed upon the parolee have been modified or eliminated by court decisions. The
prediction is that this trend will continue and that conditions will tend to be reduced
to the absolute minimum. Parole, however, can never be quite free from conditions.
Conditions are the barometer by which parole adjustment is measured. The regulatory
conditions, however, should be few, rational, and constitutional. They should be de-
signed to facilitate rehabilitation. They should not serve merely as handicaps imposed
by a rigid paroling authority.
L. CARNEY, PROBATION AND PAROLE: LEGAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 168 (1977)[hereinafter cited
as CARNEY].
34. Among the several states, the number of conditions have ranged from in excess
of twenty in New Mexico, to four in progressive Washington.
Illinois, Rhode Island, and New York have an oppressive number of conditions, each
having in excess of sixteen, with multiple subsections. Georgia, Michigan, and Oregon
are in the moderate range, with eleven, ten, and nine, respectively. Colorado, Idaho,
North Dakota, and Wisconsin have but six conditions. Massachusetts has five broad-
category regulations. The remaining states alerage in the neighborhood of fourteen
conditions.
CARNEY, supra note 33, at 171. In Virginia there exist eleven general parole conditions. The
parolee agrees that he will: (1) obey all municipal, county, state, and federal laws and
ordinances; (2) report any arrests, including traffic tickets, within three days to the district
parole officer; (3) maintain regular employment and support himself and his legal dependents
to the best of his ability; (4) obtain written permission from his parole 3fficer before buying
or operating a motor vehicle; (5) submit in person or by mail a written report at the end of
each month to his parole officer; (6) permit his parole officer to visit his home or place of
[Vol. 13:367
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"regulating the parolee's movements (including interstate travel), involve-
ment in criminal activities, drug abuse, association with undesirable com-
panions, and the possession of deadly weapons. . ."I, Many states also
provide for special conditions36 permitting the imposition of special restric-
tions "such as prohibition against contacting a former wife, traveling to a
particular area, or making overtures to the victims of the commitment
offense." 7
The constitutionality and legality of parole conditions have not been
subjected to frequent litigation. Parole conditions have essentially re-
mained unchallenged except for the areas of search and seizure (discussed
in detail below) and freedom of speech and assembly.3s In Arciniega v.
Freeman3' the Supreme Court held that parole conditions restricting the
right of association are valid only as long as the restriction furthers rehabil-
itation." It is, therefore, conceivable that other conditions such as those
restricting travel and marriage could be struck down* as violative of a
judicially declared fundamental right,4 unless the state shows that the
conditions serve legitimate and demonstrated correctional objectives."
IV. SEARCH AND SEIZURE RIaGHTS
As mentioned above, the fourth amendment 3 rights of parolees regard-
employment; (7) follow his parole officer's instructions and be truthful and cooperative; (8)
not use alcoholic beverages to excess; (9) not illegally use, possess, or distribute narcotics,
dangerous drugs, controlled substances or related paraphernalia; (10) not use, own, possess,
transport or carry a firearm; and (11) not change his residence without the permission of his
parole officer nor will he leave Virginia or travel ouside of a designated area without permis-
sion. Virginia Parole Board, Order of Release and Conditions of Parole, Parole Board Form 1
Revised 7/1/77).
35. CARNEY, supra note 33, at 172. Other common conditions regulate marriage, require
steady employment, and restrict drinking and driving privileges. Id. at 172-74.
36. The Virginia Parole Board may impose special conditions of parole relative to travel,
program participation, or special treatment. Virginia Parole Board Policy Manual 13 (April
20, 1976).
37. CARNEY, supra note 33, at 172-74.
38. See, e.g., Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971); Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp.
1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Hyland v. Procunier, 311 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
39. 404 U.S. 4 (1971).
40. Except for Virginia and Wisconsin every state provides for the restriction of a parolee's
association with "undesirables." Arluke, A Summary of Parole Rules-Thirteen Years Later,
15 CRIME & DELNQUENCY 272-73 (1969).
41. See Wolin, After Release-The Parolee in Society, 48 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1973).
42. See Note, Fourth Amendment Limitations on Probation and Parole Supervision, 1976
DUKE L.J. 71, 75-76.
43. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be viblated, and no Warrants
19791
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ing search and seizure constitute one of the areas the courts have recently
subjected to close examination. Previously the courts had virtually denied
fourth amendment guarantees to parolees by invoking the "constructive
custody"" and "act of grace' ' 5 doctrines or by relying on the parolee's
express waiver of his rights.'" For purposes of this analysis, the cases in
which there existed the parolee's express waiver of his search and seizure
rights will be disregarded, and the focus will be on those cases where such
waiver conditions have not been imposed.
The first case to suggest that a released offender should not be com-
pletely denied protection of the fourth amendment was Martin v. United
States.' There the court upheld a warrantless search of a probationer's
garage, but acknowledged that the fourth amendment's standard of rea-
sonableness must be applied in the evaluation of such searches.
Today, the varying approaches taken by the courts center primarily on
the character of the standard of reasonableness to be applied."6 All jurisdic-
tions are in agreement that searches of parolees conducted by actual law
enforcement officials must comply fully with the provisions of the fourth
amendment. There is a split of opinion, however, when the parole officer
conducts the search. The split evolves from differing attitudes toward the
parole officer-parolee relationship and the nature of the parolee's condi-
tional release. A distillation of opinion results in basically three differing
views. The first view maintains that a warrantless search conducted by a
parole officer is reasonable even in the absence of probable or reasonable
cause.' The second view maintains that such a search is valid only if the
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Odth or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
44. See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1964), cert.
denied,. 381 U.S. 953 (1965). The thrust of the doctrine is that the parolee is still in custody,
and, therefore, his rights should be "no different than one who remains in confinement." Id.
at 149-50, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
45. See, e.g., Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91, 95-97 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946
(1968); United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10, 12-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
This doctrine relies on the premise that the government has no mandatory obligation to grant
parole; therefore, the parolee has no standing to contend he is being deprived of his constitu-
tional rights.
46. See, e.g., People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 766, 488 P.2d 630, 634, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 306
(1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972); Marts v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 517, 519-
20, 122 Cal. Rptr. 687, 689 (1975).
47. 183 F.2d 436 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 904 (1950).
48. See generally Annot., 32 A.L.R. FED. 155 (1977).
49. "Reasonable cause is said to require less evidence than probable cause, but requires
some objective evidence sufficient to at least stimulate the parole officer's suspicion." Id. at
160.
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parole officer has at least reasonable cause to believe that the parolee is
violating or is about to violate the conditions of his parole.,, Finally, the
third view advocates a rigid, unchanging standard of reasonableness,
applying equally to parolees and ordinary citizens.5 A recent Fourth Cir-
cuit case12 indicates, however, that there is an emerging fourth view. This
approach appears to incorporate the concept of "variable probable cause"
with a warrant requirement.
The courts of California have adopted the first approach, essentially
"upholding conditions which grant the correctional officer unlimited power
to search."'" In People v. Hernandez" a California court concluded that the
requirement of reasonable cause is not applicable to a search of a parolee
conducted by his parole officer." The court held as follows:
For the purpose of maintaining the restraints and social safeguards accom-
panying the parolee's status, the authorities may subject him, his home and
his effects to such constant or occasional inspection and search as may seem
advisable to them .... He may not assert [Fourth Amendment] guaran-
tees against the correctional authorities who supervise him on parole. 57
Unfortunately, there exists an inherent difficulty in the parole officer-
policeman distinction: "the difficulty of protecting a released offender
from police abuses without discouraging cooperation between correctional
authorities and law enforcement officials."'" For example, in People v.
Thompson" a warrantless search was upheld even though it was precipi-
tated by information supplied by the police and the parole officer involved
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1978).
53. See Note, Striking the Balance Between Privacy and Supervision: The Fourth Amend-
ment and Parole and Probation Officer Searches of Parolees and Probationers, 51 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 800 (1976).
The hallmark of the ... variable probable cause standard is flexibility within the
confines of historical fourth amendment requirements. That flexibility enables the
standard to be tailored to the special problems encountered in particular types of
searches .... Although parole status may justify the issuance of a search warrant
on a reduced showing of probable cause, parole status alone should not justify the
issuance of a warrant. Id. at 826.
54. Note, Fourth Amendment Limitations on Probation and Parole Supervision, 1976
DUKE L.J. 71, 81.
55. 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965).
56. Id. at 150-51, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
57. Id.
58. Note, Fourth Amendment Limitations on Probation and Parole Supervision, 1976 Duke
L.J. 71, 82.
59. 252 Cal. App. 2d 76, 60 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 930 (1968).
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was not the parolee's own. On the other hand, in People v. Coffman,6" a
warrantless search initiated by the police was invalidated even though a
parole officer had accompanied them. The court concluded the police were
simply taking advantage of the parole officer's ability to avoid the require-
ment of probable cause.
The most widely accepted view seems to be that a parole officer's war-
rantless search of a parolee is valid if the parole officer has reasonable
cause to believe the parolee is violating or is about to violate the conditions
of his parole. The nature of this standard of reasonableness, however,
varies widely.
In People v. Anderson"' the court concluded that as long as a parole
officer has "reasonable grounds to believe that a parole violation has oc-
curred" a search warrant is not required."2 The Supreme Court of Missouri
held that a search was not unreasonable where the parole officer possessed
"sufficient information to arouse suspicion" of a parole violation.6 3 The
court in State v. Simms 4 held that an anonymous tip was not sufficient
to create the "well founded suspicion" of a parole violation necessary for a
warrantless parole officer search. 5 Finally, in People v. Santos66 the appro-
priate standard required "a reasonable suspicion that the undertaken
search would reveal evidence of parole violations.""
The Ninth Circuit, in Latta v. Fitzharris,"8 adopted an approach some-
what different from those above. The parole officer, having a reasonable
belief that his parolee, Latta, had violated the conditions of his parole,
arrested him at the hou se of a friend. There was no quarrel with the
validity of the arrest. Six hours after the arrest, however, the parole officer
60. 2 Cal. App. 3d 681, 82 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969).
61. 536 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1975).
62. Id. at 305. The court felt that "the measure of protection afforded to a parolee lies in a
determination of what constitutes a reasonable search under the circumstances." Id. Unfor-
tunately, the court provided no insight as to what those circumstances might be.
63. State v. Williams, 486 S.W.2d 468, 473 (Mo. 1972). It should be noted, however, that
in addition to the information possessed by the parole officer, the court considered other
factors in its determination of reasonableness, specifically, the parole officer-parolee relation-
ship and the parole officer's responsibility to the public.
64. 10 Wash. App. 75, 88, 516 P.2d 1088, 1096 (1973). The court concluded that:
[Tihe Fourth Amendment requires, as a minimum, that before a parole officer may
forcibly enter the residence of a parolee without a warrant, upon the tip of an informer,
the information upon which the officer acts must at least carry some indicia of reliabil-
ity to support an inference that the informant is telling the truth.
65. Id.
66. 82 Misc. 2d 184, 368 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
67. Id. at 192, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 138, citing People v. Randazzo, 15 N.Y.S. 2d 526, 254
N.E.2d 549 (1964).
68. 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975).
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went to Latta's own home and conducted a warrantless search which
yielded a four and one-half pound brick of marijuana. From a conviction
of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, Latta appealed, alleg-
ing that this warrantless search of his home violated his fourth amendment
rights.
In reply, the court noted that the traditional view of parolees' rights
espoused in Hernandez was not without its limits and that "under recent
decisions parolees are entitled to Fourth Amendment protection in certain
discrete situations."6 After a dissertation on the nature and purposes of
the .parole system, the court articulated its standard of reasonableness:
[Tihe parolee and his home are subject to search by the parole officer when
the officer reasonably believes that such search is necessary in the perform-
ance of his duties .... His decision may be based upon specific facts,
though they be less than sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause. It
may even be based on a "hunch," arising from what he has learned or ob-
served about the behavior and attitude of the parolee.70
In addressing the warrant requirement the court relied on precedent
holding that a parole officer need not obtain a warrant before searching his
parolee or his parolee's home.7' The court felt its decision was consistent
with two administrative search cases in which the Supreme Court ruled
the warrant requirement was unnecessary.72 In the court's view the unique-
ness of the parole officer-parolee relationship justified the decision and
provided a suitable substitute for the warrant requirement. 73 A final con-
sideration was the probability that if a warrant was required, the minimal
showing necessary to obtain it under the court's articulated standard of
reasonableness would "reduce the warrant to a paper tiger" and afford "no
real protection to the parolee."74
69. Id. at 248.
70. 521 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975). The court's rationale
was that a parole officer "ought to know more about the parolee than anyone else but his
family"; therefore, he is "in a better position than anyone else to decide whether a search is
necessary." Id. In the court's view, a grant of such powers to the parole officer was not
unreasonable under the fourth amendment.
71. Id.
72. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), the Supreme Court
held that a warrantless nonforcible entry of business premises to search for illegal liquor as
provided by 26 U.S.C. § 5146(b) was valid. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), held
lawful a warrantless non-forcible search conducted in accordance with section 923(g) of the
Gun Control Act of 1968.
73. 521 F.2d 246, 250-51 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975). See Note, Search and
Seizure Rights of Parolees and Probationers in the Ninth Circuit, 44 FoRDHAM L. Rav. 617,
627 (1975).
74. 521 F.2d 246, 251-52 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975).
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Despite this low standard of reasonableness the court asserted that
searches for the purposes of harassment or intimidation could not be up-
held, nor would "full-blown searches of parolees' homes" conducted by
parole officers "whenever and as often as they feel like it" would be law-
ful.75
The view that parolees are entitled to the full fourth amendment rights
of ordinary citizens has enjoyed limited acceptance. The only case to forth-
rightly adopt this approach was State v. Cullison,71 in which the court
found that a parole officer's warrantless search of a parolee's quarters was
unreasonable. The court held that a parole officer must obtain a warrant
upon a showing of probable cause before conducting such a search. 7
A recent case71 from the Fourth Circuit indicates that a new approach is
emerging. This approach modifies somewhat the rigid probable cause re-
quirement by its apparent adoption of a "variable probable cause" con-
cept.79 In United States v. Bradley"0 a parole officer received several calls
from the landlady of her parolee, Bradley, informing her that Bradley
possessed a loaded firearm. Such possession was in violation of federal
law,' as well as the terms of his parole. Approximately six hours after
receiving this information the parole officer went to Bradley's boarding
house room and without securing either a search warrant or Bradley's
consent conducted a search which yielded a loaded firearm. Upon convic-
tion Bradley appealed, alleging that the warrantless search violated his
fourth amendment rights. The Government urged the court to adopt the
approach of the Ninth Circuit in Latta v. Fitzharris and hold that no
warrant was required."2 In rejecting the view of the majority in Latta, the
court approved the "well-reasoned dissent" of Judge Ilufstedler8 and
75. Id. at 252.
76. 173 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970). Although the Court did
not elaborate on its finding a similar result seems to have been reached in Brown v. Kearny,
355 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1966).
77. 173 N.W.2d 533, 537-39 (Iowa 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970).
78. United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1978).
79. See note 53 supra.
80. 571 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1978).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1)(1976). See notes 26 and 27 supra.
82. 571 F.2d 787, 789 (4th Cir. 1978).
83. Id. This endorsement of Judge Hufstedler's dissent indicates the court has adopted the
,'variable probable cause" concept. Hufstedler reasoned that while
the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to search, it does not dictate that the
probable cause necessary to justify issuance of a warrant to a parole officer to search
his parolee's home must be the same as that governing issuance of a warrant to a
policeman to search a home. Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d at 255 (Hufstedler, J. dis-
senting).
Hufstedler felt that a parole officer should be given a warrant to search his parolee's residence
[Vol. 13:367
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adopted the following approach:
We therefore hold that unless an established exception to the warrant
requirement is applicable, a parole officer must secure a warrant prior to
conducting a search of a parolee's place of residence even where, as a condi-
tion of parole, the parolee has consented to periodic and unannounced visits
by the parole officer."
The court maintained that reliance by the majority in Latta on two
administrative search cases upholding warrantless searches was mis-
placed. s Rather, the court felt that Camara v. Municipal Court 6 which
required "prior judicial approval to unconsented searches even in the face
of reduced privacy interest" was the more persuasive authority,8 and that
the cases relied on by the Latta majority constituted narrow exceptions to
that rule.u
Also rejected by the court was the contention in Latta that a warrant
requirement would unreasonably disrupt the parole officer-parolee rela-
tionship. Relying again on Judge Hufstedler's dissent, the court felt that
"abuse of discretion is more easily prevented by prior judicial approval
than by post hoc judicial review.""
After asserting that the warrant requirements of the fourth amendment
were applicable, the Bradley court considered the Government's conten-
tion that there existed exigent circumstances constituting an established
upon a showing of probable cause "sufficiently flexible to accommodate the parole officer's
supervisory obligations, but not so loose as to offer the parolee and his family no protection
from arbitrary intrusions by the parole officer or from searches that are unjustifiably broad."
Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d at 257 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). Unlike the Latta majority,
Hufstedler felt that such a requirement did not reduce the warrant to a "paper tiger." Rather,
the consideration by the issuing magistrate of additional factors such as the extent of the
violation of privacy, the type of parole violations suspected, and the existence of less intrusive
means to fulfill the parole officer's supervisory responsibilities would provide a sufficient
showing to maintain the substance and statute of the warrant requirement. Id.
84. 571 F.2d 787, 789 (4th Cir. 1978).
85. Id.
86. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). "[E]xcept in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search
of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by
a valid search warrant." Id. at 528-29. The Supreme Court seemingly gave its imprimatur to
the concept of "variable probable cause" by rejecting arguments that varying the probable
cause test would authorize a "synthetic search warrant" and thereby "lessen the overall
protections of the Fourth Amendment." 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967). The Court held that
"reasonableness is still the ultimate standard" and "[i]f a valid public interest justifies the
intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search
warrant." 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967).
87. 571 F.2d 787, 789-90 (4th Cir. 1978).
88. Id. at 789.
89. Id. at 790.
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exception to those requirements. This argument was summarily dismissed
by the court, since the parole officer had waited six hours after receipt of
the information before conducting her search."
If approbation of Judge Hufstedler's dissent was not enough to show that
the court had adopted the concept of "variable probable cause,"'" further
evidence was provided in footnote one of the opinion. There the court
conceded the presence of probable cause for the search in the case at hand;
however, the court wanted it clearly understood that by that concession
they were not implying "that the probable cause for a warrant to search a
parolee's person or home is as demanding as the probable cause for a
warrant to search a suspect's person or home in an ordinary criminal inves-
tigation.""2
V. CONCLUSION
While the convicted felon on parole has historically been subject to the
deprivation of particular civil rights, courts are split as to the extent of his
entitlement to the guarantees of the fourth amendment. A few courts grant
the parole officer unlimited power to search. At the other extreme are those
courts which advocate a rigid, unchanging standard of probable cause
applying equally to parolees and ordinary citizens. Both of these views
appear clearly unsatisfactory. The latter denies the public suitable protec-
tion from the possible transgressions of a released convict, while the former
completely eviscerates the guarantees of the fourth amendment. The most
widely accepted view requires that the parole officer have reasonable cause
to believe the parolee is violating or about to violate the terms of his parole,
but even this approach provides only "illusory protection for the fourth
amendment rights of. . .parolees. '93
A view recently adopted by the Fourth Circuit offers the best balanced
standard. It modifies the rigid approach by the combination of a warrant
requirement with "variable probable cause," permitting "a judge to con-
sider parole status as a justification for issuing a warrant upon a reduced
showing of probable cause."'" The warrant requirement is intended to serve
as "a substantial deterrent to impulsive and arbitrary official conduct."9
Contrary to the assertions of the Latta majority, there is nothing to indi-
90. Id.
91. See note 81 supra.
92. 571 F.2d 787, 788 (4th Cir. 1978).
93. Note, Striking the Balance Between Privacy and Supervision: The Fourth Amendment
and Parole and Probation Officer Searches of Parolees and Probationers. 51 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
800, 825 (1976).
94. Id. at 826.
95. Id. at 827.
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cate that the warrant requirement should significantly impair the parole
officer-parolee relationship, rather it should strengthen the relationship by
promoting trust and confidence. This approach appears best suited to
fulfill the needs of the public while safeguarding constitutional guarantees.
Future cases of this nature should result in the adoption of the Bradley
standard by other jurisdictions.
Howard E. Hill

